UNIT II: NATURE AND CONCEPT OF MORALITY AND MORAL EDUCATION

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1. CONCEPT OF MORAL EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

Religious and moral education is a process where children and young people engage in a search for meaning, value and purpose in life. This involves both the exploration of beliefs and values and the study of how such beliefs and values are expressed. Moral education, however, is generally understood to cut across the curriculum and is appropriately integrated into all courses as well as into the extra-curricular activities and ethos of schools.

1.1. RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

In secular usage, religious education is the teaching of a particular religion (although in England the term religious instruction would refer to the teaching of a particular religion, with religious education referring to teaching about religions in general) and its varied aspects: its beliefs, doctrines, rituals, customs, rites, and personal roles. In Western and secular culture, religious education implies a type of education which is largely separate from academia, and which (generally) regards religious belief as a fundamental tenet and operating modality, as well as a prerequisite for attendance.

Key concepts

There are a number of key concepts that underpin the study of RE. Pupils need to understand these concepts in order to deepen and broaden their knowledge, skills and understanding.

- **Beliefs, teachings and sources** a Interpreting teachings, sources, authorities and ways of life in order to understand religions and beliefs. b Understanding and responding critically to beliefs and attitudes.
- **Practices and ways of life** a Exploring the impact of religions and beliefs on how people live their lives. b Understanding that religious practices are diverse, change over time and are influenced by cultures.
- **Expressing meaning** a Appreciating that individuals and cultures express their beliefs and values through many different forms. Religions and beliefs: These include systems of thought that are religious and non-religious, theistic and non-theistic, Western and Eastern, Abrahamic and dharmic.

- **Identity, diversity and belonging** a Understanding how individuals develop a sense of identity and belonging through faith or belief. b Exploring the variety, difference and relationships that exist within and between religions, values and beliefs.

- **Meaning, purpose and truth** a Exploring some of the ultimate questions that confront humanity, and responding imaginatively to them.

- **Values and commitments** a Understanding how moral values and a sense of obligation can come from beliefs and experience. b Evaluating their own and others’ values in order to make informed, rational and imaginative choices.

**Key processes:**

These are the essential skills and processes in RE that pupils need to learn to make progress.

Learning about religion Pupils should be able to:

- investigate the impact of religious beliefs and teachings on individuals, communities and societies, the reasons for commitment and the causes of diversity
- apply a wide range of religious and philosophical vocabulary consistently and accurately, recognising both the power and limitations of language in expressing religious ideas and beliefs
- explain religious beliefs, practices and commitments, including their transmission by people, texts and traditions
- evaluate how religious beliefs and teachings inform answers to ultimate questions and ethical issues e interpret a range of sources, texts, authorities, and forms of religious and spiritual expression from a variety of contexts f analyse religious beliefs, arguments and ideas

**Learning from religion Pupils should be able to:**

- Reflect on the relationship between beliefs, teachings, world issues and ultimate questions
- Evaluate beliefs, commitments and the impact of religion in the contemporary world
• Express insights into the significance and value of religion and other world views for human relationships personally, locally and globally

• Express their own beliefs and ideas, using a variety of forms of expression, including creative forms and reasoned arguments.

Range and content

This section outlines the breadth of the subject on which teachers should draw when teaching the key concepts and key processes. The study of RE should include:

• Christianity

• At least two other principal religions

• A religious community of local significance, where appropriate

• A secular world view, where appropriate.

All of the above can be taught through the following themes:

• Beliefs and concepts: the key ideas and questions of meaning in religions and beliefs, including issues related to God, truth, the world, human life, and life after death

• Authority: different sources of authority and how they inform believers’ lives

• Religion and science: issues of truth, explanation, meaning and purpose

• Expressing spirituality: how and why understanding of the self and human experiences is expressed in a variety of forms

• Ethics and relationships: questions and influences that inform ethical and moral choices, including forgiveness and issues of good and evil

• Rights and responsibilities: what religions and beliefs say about human rights and responsibilities, social justice and citizenship

• Global issues – what religions and beliefs say about health, wealth, war, animal rights and the environment

• Interfaith dialogue – a study of relationships, conflicts and collaboration within and between religions and beliefs.

Curriculum opportunities

During the key stage pupils should be offered the following opportunities that are integral to their learning and enhance their engagement with the concepts, processes and content of the subject. The curriculum should provide opportunities for pupils to:
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- Encounter people from different religious, cultural and philosophical groups, who can express a range of convictions on religious and moral issues, where possible
- Visit places of major religious significance, where possible
- Use ICT to enhance understanding of religion
- Discuss, question and evaluate important issues in religion and philosophy, including ultimate questions and ethical issues
- Reflect upon and carefully evaluate their own and others’ beliefs and values, using reasoned, balanced arguments
- Use a range of forms of expression to communicate their ideas and responses
- Explore the connections between re and other subject areas.

1.2. MORAL EDUCATION

Interpretations of the process of moral education are quite differentiated and subject to change, according to the modality of the study of moral phenomenon (and its components), and the consistency of the cognitive results of this study. On the other hand, moral education cannot ignore lack of moral education among youth and grown-ups, as a result of not mastering or of incorrect use of moral language.

We define the concept of moral education by taking into account two components of moral life: the objective component (social-axiological), and the subjective component (psychological), that is, human behavior and the development of its features. According to these components, we can formulate extremely various objectives of this education and can analyze their connections with one or another form of education (intellectual, civil, political, professional, ecological, religious, etc.). Thus, we can move beyond simple opinions that emphasize one or another component of moral life.

If we adopt a social-axiological position, the objective of moral education is considered to be the knowledge of moral values and their capitalization by a subject or a community for an active and responsible integration, against such moral non-values as evil, hypocrisy, cowardliness, moral opportunism, etc.

If we deal only with the psychological component of moral education, its objective is moral behavior, within such diversity of its manifestations in human relations as moral feelings and expectations, moral motives and interests, acting out one’s likes and decisions. By its two
dimensions (social and psychological), this kind of behavior has particular features and a structure of its own. Namely, as a functional modification of a few psychic processes (cognitive, emotional and psycho-motor), moral behavior is expressed in an emotional form (voice, mime, gesture, motor and vegetative acts), a relational one (devotion to other people and a special way of communicating with them, depending on the opinion about oneself and the others’ opinion about one as a person), and a standard social-cultural form related to the historical situation of society from the point of view of culture and civilization in which it is present (for example, the way of congratulating someone on success, the way of appealing to officials or of making critical remarks, by uttering moral opinions or disagreements, etc.). This behavior can be defined by sincerity or lack of sincerity, by relational balance or lack of balance, and by reciprocity (the same requests and expectations from other moral subjects) or, on the contrary, the lack of reciprocity.

2.1. MORAL EDUCATION VIS-À-VIS RELIGIOUS EDUCATION

- Is concerned with the spiritual growth of the pupil, with those feelings
- And beliefs which arise out of experience and which influence the search for meaning, value and purpose in life. For some, namely the denominational schools, such experience will be interpreted within their own tradition.
- Encourage pupils to become aware of a wide range of religious interpretations of personal experience and of their importance to believers
- Fosters attitudes of open enquiry and awareness of prejudice
- Helps pupils to appreciate that religion offers a distinctive interpretation of life. It also encourages them to think honestly for themselves about religious beliefs and practice and the implications of moral issues within religions
- Makes a distinctive contribution to the curriculum in helping pupils towards a consistent set of beliefs, values, attitude and practices. Other aspects of the school ethos and curriculum also aim to help pupils in their search for answers to some of life’s deepest questions

Religious and Moral Education should encourage pupils over their school life to:

- recognise religion as an important expression of human experience
- reflect on and respond to the values, beliefs and practices of religious
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- traditions within our community and beyond
- be aware of the practical consequences of religious commitment
- evaluate and in turn, confirm, deepen or come to their own
- understanding of the meaning, value and purpose of life

3.1. LANGUAGE AND MORAL EDUCATION: ITS FORM AND CONTEXT

Romanian research on language linguistics and philosophy appreciates that the meaning of a term refers to "all its possibilities . . . of meaning: objects, actions, ideas, phenomena. They awaken representations in our minds, as well as make connections among these representations." The meaning of a word is determined by three factors:

- Objective reality to which the word is related;
- The way in which the speaker sees this objective reality, and
- The way in which the speaker makes use of the word, namely the exchange value of the word".

On this basis, there is the idea of a general subdivision of the terminology of moral language into practical terms (moral relation, moral interest, moral action), standard-axiological term (moral value, moral rule, moral sense, moral choice, moral decision), and behavior-estimating and instrumental terms (moral judgment, moral estimation, moral opinion, moral punishment, moral habit, moral routine, etc.).

A second remark concerns the correct or incorrect use of the terminology of moral language depending on their supposed meaning and the intentions or objectives of the person using it. According to C. L. Stevenson, moral language can be used in two directions: one for remembering, explaining and communicating certain opinions or for trying to change the interest of another person, and another for stimulating people to action or to a certain behavior.

Thus, there is a double use of moral language: a descriptive one and a suggestive one (which emphasizes something worthy) in which moral terms are "devices used in the complicated game of adjustment and readjustment of human interests." These uses are accompanied by various moral statements or sentences both descriptive and permissive. The diversity of moral statements helps us to understand a lot of attitudes related to their truthfulness or falsity. For example, moral falsity is seen by Richard Harell as connected to the incorrect use of moral
terms, so that in order to find out whether someone behaves this way, we should find out if he lets us know what is true or speaks deliberately in a false manner. So we should distinguish the correct uses of moral language from false statements, whether deliberate or not, even if it is difficult to make this distinction.

3.2. Characteristics of Morally Mature Person

What kind of human being do we want to emerge from our efforts at moral education? What are the characteristics of the morally mature person? A moment's reflection tells us that moral maturity is more than just knowing what is right. The world is full of people who know what right but set moral considerations aside when they find it expedient to do so. To be moral means to value morality, to take moral obligations seriously. It means to be able to judge what is right but also to care deeply about doing it— and to possess the will, competence, and habits needed to translate moral judgment and feeling into effective moral. We submit that the morally mature person has six major characteristics, which are derived from universal moral and democratic principles. These characteristics offer schools and communities a context for discourse about school programs and moral

The morally mature person habitually:

1. Respects human dignity, which includes

   • Showing regard for the worth and rights of all persons,
   • Avoiding deception and dishonesty,
   • Promoting human equality,
   • Respecting freedom of conscience,
   • Working with people of different views, and
   • Refraining from prejudiced actions.

2. Cares about the welfare of others, which includes

   • Recognizing interdependence among people,
   • Caring for one's country,
   • Seeking social justice,
   • Taking pleasure in helping others, and
   • Working to help others reach moral maturity.
3. **Integrates individual interests and social responsibilities, which includes**
   - Becoming involved in community life,
   - Doing a fair share of community work,
   - Displaying self-regarding and other-regarding moral virtues—self-control,
   - Diligence, fairness, kindness, honesty, civility—in everyday life,
   - Fulfilling commitments, and
   - Developing self-esteem through relationships with others.

4. **Demonstrates integrity, which includes**
   - Practicing diligence,
   - Taking stands for moral principles,
   - Displaying moral courage,
   - Knowing when to compromise and when to confront, and
   - Accepting responsibility for one's choices.

5. **Reflects on moral choices, which includes**
   - Recognizing the moral issues involved in a situation,
   - Applying moral principles (such as the golden rule) when making moral judgments,
   - Thinking about the consequences of decisions, and to be informed about important moral issues in society and the world.

6. **Seeks peaceful resolution of conflict, which includes**
   - Striving for the fair resolution of personal and social conflicts,
   - Avoiding physical and verbal aggression,
   - Listening carefully to others,
   - Encouraging others to communicate, and
   - Working for peace.

In general, then, the morally mature person understands moral principles accepts responsibility for applying them.
4.1. JUSTICE AND CARE: MARTHA NAUSSBAUM

The Basic Idea about Human Beings

Martha Naussbaum affirms a "liberal" view that is compatible with the feminist affirmation of the value of women as persons. "At the heart of this tradition [of liberal political thought] is a twofold intuition about human beings: namely, that all, just by being human, are of equal dignity and worth, no matter where they are situated in society, and that the primary source of this worth is a power of moral choice within them, a power that consists in the ability to plan a life in accordance with one's own evaluation of ends." To these two ideas is linked one more, that "the moral equality of persons gives them a fair claim to certain types of treatment at the hands of society and politics. respect and promote the liberty of choice, and ...respect and promote the equal worth of persons as choosers."

Nussbaum's view holds that "the core of rational and moral personhood is something all human beings share, shaped though it may be in different ways by their differing social circumstances. And it does give this core a special salience in political thought, defining the public realm in terms of it, purposefully refusing the same salience ... to gender and rank and class and religion." Her approach to women's issues is "part of a systematic and justifiable program that addresses hierarchy across the board in the name of human dignity." Her view is that political theory should be based on "the conception of human beings as essentially rational agents." The key type of reason to be emphasized is practical (i.e., moral and political) reason.

The Role of Capabilities (Substantial Freedoms)

At the heart of Nussbaum's liberal theory of justice and human rights is Amartya Sen's concept of substantial freedoms or capabilities. Sen developed this notion as a way of addressing questions of justice and human development. (For more on Sen's ideas see The Ethics of Substantial Freedom.) Before we can talk intelligently about just distributions, we have to decide on a dimension whose relative value is important. If, for example, equal distribution is just, we have to know equal distribution of what? In relation to human development, specifically, poverty, the question is to know precisely what we should be striving to increase.
The Basic Capabilities

A necessary component of Nussbaum's capability approach is the list of basic capabilities. She asks an Aristotelian question, "What activities characteristically performed by human beings are so central that they seem definitive of the a life that is truly human?" Two more precise questions are then formulated, (1) "Which changes or transitions are compatible with the continued existence of a being as a member of the human kind and which are not?" and (2) "What kinds of activity must be there if we are going to acknowledge that a given life is human?"

- Life. Being able to live to the end of a human life of normal length . . .
- Bodily health and integrity.
- Bodily integrity. Being able to move freely from place to place; being able to be secure against violent assault, including sexual assault . . .
- Senses, imagination, thought. Being able to use the senses; being able to imagine, to think, and to reason . . .; being able to use one's mind in ways protected by guarantees of freedom of expression with respect to both political and artistic speech and freedom of religious exercise; being able to have pleasurable experiences and to avoid nonbeneficial pain
- Emotions. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside ourselves; being able to love those who love and care for us . . . not having one's emotional developing blighted by fear or anxiety.
- Practical reason. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical reflection about the planning of one's own life.
- Affiliation Being able to live for and in relation to others, to recognize and show concern for other human beings, to engage in various forms of social interaction; being able to imagine the situation of another and to have compassion for that situation; having the capability for both justice and friendship. . . . Being able to be treated as a dignified being whose worth is equal to that of others.
- Other species. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the world of nature.
- Play. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities.
- Control over one's environment. (A) Political: being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life; having the rights of political participation, free
speech and freedom of association . . . (B) Material: being able to hold property (both land and movable goods); having the right to seek employment on an equal basis with others . . .

There are two important qualifications on this list: First, they are a list of separate components. They are distinct in quality and all are of central importance. Second, they are related to one another in complex ways that can only be discovered empirically. Note that in her formulation of the basic capabilities the formula "being able to" is found in almost every example.

**Internal and Combined Capabilities**

Internal capabilities are states of persons that are . . . sufficient conditions for the exercise of the corresponding function (given suitable complement of external conditions). Most adults have the internal capabilities of use of speech. Combined capabilities are defined as internal capabilities plus the external conditions that make the exercise of a function a live option. The aim of public policy is the promotion of combined capabilities; this requires two kinds of efforts (1) the promotion of internal capabilities (say, by education or training) and (2) the making available of the external institutional and material conditions.

### 4.2. NEL NODDINGS

Nel Noddings (1929- ) has made a significant contribution to our appreciation of education. In particular her explorations of the ethics of care – and their relationship to schooling, welfare, and to learning and teaching within families and local communities came at a especially apposite moment. She has been able to demonstrate the significance of caring and relationship both as an educational goal, and as a fundamental aspect of education. As a result Nel Noddings’ work has become a key reference point for those wanting to reaffirm the ethical and moral foundations of teaching, schooling and education more broadly. Her work has included analysis of caring and its place in ethics (Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education – 1984); an attempt to rethink evil from the perspective of women (Women and Evil – 1989) and a series of books that have explored the implications of a concern for caring with education (The Challenge to Care in Schools – 1992; Educating Moral People – 2002; Happiness and Education – 2003). Nel Noddings has also sought to encourage people to engage philosophically with education (Philosophy of Education, Educating for Intelligent Belief or Unbelief – 1995), and explored welfare policy if caring – a
way of life learned in homes – is placed at its centre (Starting at Home: Caring and Social Policy – 2002). In this article we explore her contribution, some issues arising from Nel Noddings’ work and the implications for educators.

**Caring**

Nel Noddings is closely identified with the promotion of the ethics of care, – the argument that caring should be a foundation for ethical decision-making. Her first major work Caring (1984) explored what she described as a ‘feminine approach to ethics and moral education’. Her argument starts from the position that care is basic in human life – that all people want to be cared for. She also starts from the position that while men and women are guided by an ethic of care, ‘natural’ caring – ‘a form of caring that does not require an ethical effort to motivate it (although it may require considerable physical and mental effort in responding to needs)’ can have a significant basis in women’s experience. ‘Natural caring’, thus, is a moral attitude – ‘a longing for goodness that arises out of the experience or memory of being cared for’. On this basis Nel Noddings explores the notion of ethical caring – ‘a state of being in relation, characterized by receptivity, relatedness and engrossment’.

**Sympathy**

What caring actually means and entails is not that easy to establish. Nel Noddings’ approach is to examine how caring is actually experienced (what we might describe as a phenomenological analysis). She asks “what are we like” when we engage in caring encounters? ‘Perhaps the first thing we discover about ourselves’, she continues, ‘is that we are receptive; we are attentive in a special way’. This attention shares some similarities with what Carl Rogers describes as ‘empathy’ (see Carl Rogers. core conditions and education). However, Noddings is cautious as ‘empathy’ is ‘peculiarly western and masculine’ in its Western usage (op. cit.). Instead she prefers to talk about ‘sympathy’ – feeling with – as more nearly capturing ‘the affective state of attention in caring’.

Receptive attention is an essential characteristic of a caring encounter. The carer is open to what the cared-for is saying and might be experiencing and is able to reflect upon it. However, there is also something else here – motivational displacement. In other words, the carer’s ‘motive energy’ flows towards the ‘cared-for’. The carer thus responds to the cared-for in ways that are, hopefully, helpful. For this to be called ‘caring’ a further step is required – there must also be some recognition on the part of the cared-for that an act of caring has
occurred. Caring involves connection between the carer and the cared-for and a degree of reciprocity; that is to say that both gain from the encounter in different ways and both give.

A caring encounter, thus, has three elements according to Nel Noddings:

- A cares for B – that is A’s consciousness is characterized by attention and motivational displacement – and
- A performs some act in accordance with , and
- B recognizes that A cares for B.

We could say that a caring person ‘is one who fairly regularly establishes caring relations and, when appropriate maintains them over time

**Caring-about and caring-for**

Nel Noddings helpfully, also, highlights the distinction between caring-for and caring-about. Thus far, we have been looking largely at caring-for – face-to-face encounters in which one person cares directly for another. Caring-about is something more general – and takes us more into the public realm. We may be concerned about the suffering of those in poor countries and wish to do something about it (such as giving to a development charity). As Noddings initially put it, caring-about involves ‘a certain benign neglect’. She continued, ‘One is attentive just so far. One assents with just so much enthusiasm. One acknowledges. One affirms. One contributes five dollars and goes on to other things’. However, in her later works Nel Noddings has argued that caring-about needs more attention. We learn first what it means to be cared-for. ‘Then, gradually, we learn both to care for and, by extension, to care about others’. This caring-about, Noddings argues, is almost certainly the foundation for our sense of justice.

The key, central to care theory, is this: caring-about (or, perhaps a sense of justice) must be seen as instrumental in establishing the conditions under which caring-for can flourish. Although the preferred form of caring is cared-for, caring-about can help in establishing, maintaining, and enhancing it. Those who care about others in the justice sense must keep in mind that the objective is to ensure that caring actually occurs. Caring-about is empty if it does not culminate in caring relations.

From this we can see that caring-about is a significant force in society. As well as being an important feature of our sense of justice, it also contributes to the cultivation of social capital.
We learn to care-about, according to Nel Noddings, through our experience of being cared-for. Instead of starting with an ideal state or republic, care theory starts with an ideal home and moves outward – ‘learning first what it means to be cared for, then to care for intimate others, and finally to care about those we cannot care for directly’.

**Caring, schooling and education**

Nel Noddings sees education (in its widest sense) as being central to the cultivation of caring in society. She defines education as ‘a constellation of encounters, both planned and unplanned, that promote growth through the acquisition of knowledge, skills, understanding and appreciation’. Given the above, it is not surprising that she places a special emphasis on the home as a site for educational encounter. Indeed, she views the home as the primary educator and argues for the re-orientation of social policy to this end. This is not to sideline the role of schools but simply to recognize just what the home contributes to the development of children and young people.

As soon as we view the home as the primary educator two major things follow in terms of social policy. These are that first, every child should ‘live in a home that has at least adequate material resources and attentive love; and second, that schools should include education for home life in their curriculum’. Both of these recommendations have far reaching consequences. For example, in the case of the first, while some governments have attempted to ensure that there are something like adequate material resources in homes where there are children, there is little evidence of policymakers seriously grappling with how attentive love might be fostered. Similarly, the question of education for home life is not normally addressed in anything like an adequate form. Indeed, the whole orientation of schooling systems in most ‘advanced capitalist’ countries is toward skilling for the needs of business and the economy. Some attention is paid to personal, social and life education – but it generally remains woefully inadequate when set against the demands of care theory. A further significant element here is the direction of a great deal of educational philosophy and theory. For example, John Dewey talks about education in terms of preparation for ‘public life’. While it is possible to see what place education for home life might have in this (and the extent to which caring-for is linked to the cultivation of caring-about) the way in which education is often discussed in terms of public life can be seen as not taking full account of what might be needed for personal flourishing.
A third element can also be seen as following from viewing the home as the primary educator, that ‘schools should, as far as possible, use the sort of methods found in best homes to educate’. This has far reaching consequences and takes us into the arena of informal education – and the appreciation and facility to move beyond understandings of education that are centred around notions such as curriculum into more conversational and incidental forms.

**Modelling, dialogue, practice and confirmation**

Nel Noddings has argued that education from the care perspective has four key components: modelling, dialogue, practice and confirmation.

**Modelling.** Within a care perspective, not unexpectedly, educators are concerned with the growth of people as carers and cared-fors. Unlike cognitive developmentalists, for example, they are not primarily interested in moral reasoning (although there is a recognition that reasoning is important. Educators have to show in their behaviour what it means to care. “We do not merely tell them to care and give them texts to read on the subject, we demonstrate our caring in our relations with them”

**Dialogue.** The intent is to engage people in dialogue about caring. As Nel Noddings has pointed out, ‘dialogue is such an essential part of caring that we could not model caring without engaging in it’ (op. cit.). In addition, it is also important to talk directly about, and explore, our caring – as it can be manifested in very different ways. It can, thus help people to critique and better understand their own relationships and practice. In other words, it allows us to evaluate our attempts to care: ‘As we try to care, we are helped in our efforts by the feedback we get from the recipients of our care’. Furthermore, and crucially, dialogue contributes to the growth of cared-fors.

**Practice.** Nel Noddings argues that the experiences in which we immerse ourselves tend to produce a ‘mentality’. ‘If we want to produce people who will care for another, then it makes sense to give students practice in caring and reflection on that practice’.

**Confirmation.** This particular component, it is suggested, sets caring apart from other approaches to moral education. In making her case Nel Noddings draws particularly on the work of Martin Buber. He describes confirmation as an act of affirming and encouraging the best in others.
When we confirm someone, we identify a better self and encourage its development. To do this we must know the other reasonably well. Otherwise we cannot see what the other is really striving for, what ideal he or she may long to make real. Formulas and slogans have no place in confirmation. We do not posit a single ideal for everyone and then announce ‘high expectations for all’. Rather we recognize something admirable, or at least acceptable, struggling to emerge in each person we encounter. The goal or attribute must be seen as worthy both by the person trying to achieve it and by us. We do not confirm people in ways we judge to be wrong.

Significantly, such confirmation involves trust and continuity. The latter is needed as we need knowledge of the other (op. cit.) and the former as the career needs to be credible and to be capable of handling explorations and what emerges sensitively.

Caring and ethical theory

Nel Noddings suggests that neither utilitarianism (making decisions on the basis of anticipated consequences) nor deontology (principled reasoning) can provide a proper understanding of the way women approached ethical questions and concerns. ‘The approach through law and principle is not’, she suggested, ‘the approach of the mother. It is the approach of the detached one, of the father’. She does not argue that there are distinctively different approaches empirically typical of men and women but rather looks to a ‘feminine view’ in ‘the deep classical sense – rooted in receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness’ (op. cit.). Natural caring, such as that of a mother for a child, according to Nel Noddings, comes before ethical caring and is preferable to it.

In contrast “ethical” caring does have to be summoned. The “I ought” arises but encounters conflict: An inner voice grumbles, “I ought but I don’t want to,” or “Why should I respond?” or “This guy deserves to suffer, so why should I help?” On these occasions we need not turn to a principle; more effectively we turn to our memories of caring and being cared for and a picture or ideal of ourselves as carers… Ethical caring’s great contribution is to guide action long enough for natural caring to be restored and for people once again to interact with mutual and spontaneous regard. Care theory is seen as reversing Kantian priorities. Nel Noddings, by putting ‘natural’ caring above ethical caring, takes the view that latter is instrumental in ‘establishing or restoring’ the former

5.1. PERSPECTIVES ON MORALITY
Morality, at its most basic, is the distinction between right and wrong, and while this sounds simple, it's actually very complex. Different people in different societies have morals, so how do we start sorting them out? Well, luckily for us, there are already a few perspectives where we can start.

**Autonomy**

Where do we look for morals? What is the most basic unit of morality? Well, look no further. I mean, it's not me; that's not what I'm saying. Actually, just the opposite. It's you. In the perspective of autonomy, the individual self is the basis of morality. In this theory, it all comes down to the choice of the individual. What is truly moral and what is not? Even more importantly, what does that morality mean? Society can tell you that something is right or wrong, but at the end of the day, it's a personal choice to accept that or to reject it. For example, the law says don't steal. Okay, there's a moral standard, but you have to decide not to steal. This means that the most fundamental aspect of morality is the action of the individual person. What this also means, however, is that people are responsible for their own actions. When you act, you judge what is right and wrong for yourself, and if you choose to do something that is outside our society's expectations, you are personally responsible for having made that choice.

**Heteronomy**

So, autonomy looks to the individual self for morality. But this is a question of philosophy, so naturally, there are multiple sides to this. The opposite of autonomy is heteronomy, morals defined by a force outside of the individual. This means that you do not defining morality; it is defined for you. Let's see an example. The law says don't steal. If you don't steal because you believe it's wrong, that's autonomy at work. But if the only reason you don't steal is because you're afraid of being caught, that's an external force pressuring you, or heteronomy. Now, that's admittedly not a perfect example, because autonomous societies do have laws, as long as people are aware that the laws are created, not universal, and they have a say in what those are. The laws that govern heteronymous societies are more...out there - beyond the ability of society to control. Things like the ancestors, tradition, and national identity. These are heteronomous forces and are seen by some as immoral because they do not respect individual choice. Others see them as necessary so that moral systems feel permanent, which prevents people from disobeying them.
Theonomy

There is one other perspective we should talk about. Theonomy is the belief that all morals, both personal and societal, are based in religion. Generally, this term is used to describe the belief that all morals are found in the Christian Bible, although really it can be applied to any Religion. So, this is a heteronymous moral theory, because an external force, over which the individual has zero control, is defining morality.

5.1. DICHOTOMY BETWEEN REASON AND PASSION

The belief in the reason/passion dichotomy has a number of causes. The first is the belief that to be truly objective, you must be impartial and not influenced by emotion. If you feel strongly about an issue, it is taken as a sign that you cannot be rational about it. If this were true, it would be enough to sever reason and passion. Fortunately, reason need not be sacrificed to emotion And emotion need not conflict with reality.

A second cause of the reason/passion dichotomy stems from the mind/body one. It is the belief that the physical and mental world are separate and opposite. People consider passion as very worldly. It shows an emphasis on our lives and the world around us. It screams, "This is important!" Passion is powerful. We use it for emotions that are based on value-judgments. Whether it's love or hate, joy or anger, we experience it in response to what is important in our lives.

Reason, on the other hand, is often considered abstract. As with the Scholastics arguing about angels dancing on the head of a pin, it is seen as interesting, but not particularly relevant. It is seen as "other worldly" and more of a form of amusement than anything practical. Philosophers through history have encouraged this belief by making a life out of pointless "reasoning", all the while achieving nothing and not even practicing what they preach.

Reason and passion are not opposites though. In fact, they are complementary and properly go together. An emotion is a programmed, automated response to a particular value-judgment. The value-judgment is determined by reason. Properly, reason and passion align and mutually reinforce each other. A solid reasoning provides increased strength to the passion, removing any subconscious doubts. A strong passion provides perspective on what is important, and allows a more focused reasoning. It keeps you focused on what's really important.
Passion without reason is a flight of fancy. It has no support from the mind, which leaves lingering doubts. An emotion can never be as strong when it defies reason. Reason fights against it, dissolving it over time. Those who claim they feel passion without reason are merely claiming that they are impervious to the effects of reason. Reason without passion is equally implausible. If one really has acquired an understanding of something important, the passion should follow from the reasoning. Only when the "reason" is rationalistic, non-integrated and undigested can it be devoid of emotion. If someone claims that something is crucial to your life and well-being, but can't get excited about it, it is a sign that he doesn't actually grasp the idea.

Let's take an example. Love is an area where most people have some experience in, and it illustrates the point well. An example of passion without reason is when you feel love towards someone you know or strongly suspect is wrong for you. In this case, reason and emotion are battling each other. Often people try to ignore their reasoning in order to try to make the relationship work. It can't be done, though. Whatever passion there might have been at first dies out. Even if the emotion remains, it is twisted and contradictory. The result is a love/hate relationship. When passion and reason combine, though, the emotion of love is amplified. They work together, increasing the feeling. This is partly why infatuation is so strong at first. Since you don't know much about the other person, you fill in the gaps with your own preferences. Until the illusion is shattered, your mind will encourage the emotion, as it interprets new information to correspond with your preferences. Even this doesn't compare to the intensity when reason and passion really align. This is what people mean when they talk about true love. Love that is intense, and has no doubts. This is how reason and passion should always be. Working together to promote happiness. Due to the lack of understanding of the roles of reason and passion, people have chosen a side at the expense of the other. The men of reason have opted for cold, dry logic in an attempt to show their objectivity and seriousness. The defenders of reason have surrendered passion to the irrational. It's time to reclaim it.

6.2. MORAL JUDGEMENT AND MORAL ACTION

The moral judgement is the judgement which deals with the moral value or quality of an action. It is a judgement of value and it evaluates the rightness or wrongness of our actions. When we analyse a moral judgement then we find that it contains a) a subject which will judge, b) an object whose action will be judged, c) a standard in conformity to which the
action of the subject will be judged and d) a power of judging the action as required. Moral judgment is the judgment of moral quality of voluntary habitual actions. Generally, a moral judgment is given on the voluntary and habitual actions of a rational being. The voluntary actions of a rational person which involve deliberation, choice, and resolution, have the moral quality of rightness and wrongness. They are considered to be right or wrong with the reference to the moral standard. And on the basis of this standard, moral judgment is given. If the voluntary actions have conformity with the standard or the ideal, then the moral judgment will express it as the right action. If the action has conflict with the standard or norms, then the moral judgment will express it as wrong. So, moral judgment involves comparison of voluntary acts with the moral standard. Moral judgment is active in nature. Because moral judgment is given upon voluntary and habitual acts of persons and not upon their passive experiences. Moral judgment is social in character. Because, as we know, voluntary acts of a person are right or wrong, because they more or less affect the of interest of others. Man is a social being. His rights and duties of actions rise out of his relation to other persons in society. So, moral judgment, apart from society is inconceivable. Moral judgment can be said to be obligatory in character. Because a judgment can be given as right, while we feel the moral obligation to do it. Similarly, moral judgment is given on an act as wrong, when we feel the moral obligation to refrain from it. Thus, moral judgment is always accompanied by the sense of duty or moral obligation. And this moral obligation is essentially self-imposed. In this way, we can find out the meaning of moral judgment.

How are the moral judgements different from logical judgements?

- Moral judgements are distinguished from logical judgements. Logical judgements refer to the ideal of Truth and it is merely a judgement about. But moral judgements refer to the ideal of supreme Good. The supreme Good or the highest Good is the ultimate standard of moral judgement.
- In moral judgement there is always moral obligation and moral sentiments. Moral obligation is the sense of duty or oughtness.
- Again, moral judgements are accompanied by a feeling of approval or disapproval, feeling of complacence or remorse etc. when we judge an action to be right, we feel under moral obligation to perform it and have a feeling of approval. When we judge an action to be wrong we feel under moral obligation not to perform it and have a feeling of disapproval. But all are lacking in logical judgement.
Mackenzie holds that moral judgement is a judgement upon action with reference to the moral ideal. For him moral judgement is not like a logical judgement which is a judgement about an action. He says that moral judgement does not consider the nature of an action, but it considers its moral value.

Muirhead says that moral judgement is not a judgement in the logical sense of a ‘proposition’ but that it is a judgement in the judicial sense of a ‘sentence’.

**Moral judgements differ from Aesthetics judgements.**

- Moral judgements are also distinguished from Aesthetic judgements.
- Though moral judgements and aesthetic judgements are the matter of normative sciences, but their norms are different.
- Moral judgement deals with the ideal of Highest Good whereas aesthetic judgement deals with the ideal of Beauty.
- Again, aesthetic judgements are not accompanied by moral obligation and moral sentiments.
- On the other hand moral judgements are obligatory in nature and accompanied by moral sentiments.
- Moral judgement has objective validity. An action is right in a particular situation from the standpoint of the universe. It is not determined by the subjective inclination and prejudices of the person who makes the judgement.

**THE OBJECT OF MORAL JUDGEMENT**

Moral judgments are passed on the voluntary actions and habitual actions. Actually habitual actions are voluntary actions turned into habit after constant repetitions. Hence, only voluntary actions are objects of moral judgement and they are judged to be right or wrong.

Voluntary actions imply the freedom of will. Non voluntary actions are outside the scope of moral judgement.

Voluntary action has some internal factors:

- The mental stage of spring of action, motive, intention, desire, deliberation, choice and resolution.
- The organic stage of bodily action.
- The external stage of consequence
Now the question arises—

- Do we judge an act by its motives or by its consequence?
  
  Or

- Is motive or consequence of a voluntary action the object of moral judgement?
- Is motive alone or intention the object of moral judgement?
- Is intention of character the object of moral judgement?

**THE SUBJECT OF MORAL JUDGEMENT**

The subject of the moral judgement is the rational self or ideal self. Mackenzie holds that a person judges an action to be right or wrong from the standpoint of an ideal standard. For him, by the subject of the moral judgement we mean the point of view from which an action is judged to be good or bad. Shaftesbury maintains that conduct is judged to be good or bad by the moral connoisseur. Like Shaftesbury, Adam Smith holds that a person passes moral judgement on his own actions and actions of others from the stand point of an impartial spectator. The different interpretations of the subjects of the moral judgement bring out the fact that moral judgements involve a higher point of view of the ideal self. The ideal self passes moral judgements on the motives, intentions, on his own actions and actions of others.

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